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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last thirty years, the legal academy has turned a cold
shoulder to the subject matter of this symposium: scholarship for
equal justice. I am here to suggest that a thaw may be on the way.
By scholarship for equal justice—as distinguished from
scholarship about that topic—I mean academic work undertaken
for the purpose of improving outcomes for individuals and
members of groups who have been systematically held back by their
race, sex, poverty, or any other basis for rationing success that our
legal system treats with suspicion. With reference to some of my
own work and that of other legal academics around the country, I
want to suggest the possibility of a new scholarship for equal justice
that can satisfy this definition, and can be a powerful instrument of
change, without violating academic norms favoring objectivity over
advocacy. In the process, I offer some off-the-cuff thoughts about
how the academy arrived at its longstanding distaste for scholarship
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for equal protection, why things may be changing, where those
changes may be leading equal justice-oriented scholarship, and
what kinds of serious, everyday social problems this new scholarship
might help to solve.
II. RESPECTING THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF SCHOLARSHIP
AND ADVOCACY
The idea that legal scholarship may be undertaken for equal
justice remains controversial. Indeed, for some, the idea is
positively self-contradictory: scholarship requires neutrality;
advocacy forbids it. The two can no more be stably blended than
oil and water. Indeed, when what is being advocated is worth
caring about, as equal justice certainly is, the effect on objectivity
may be so great that the two perhaps should not even be mixed in
the same career, no matter how zesty the academic-professional
vinaigrette that otherwise might result.
The assumption of incompatibility between legal work for
equal justice and scholarship has occasionally cropped up in my
own legal career. During my six-year stint at the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund, for example, I had lunch with a law school dean
(now, ironically perhaps, a judge) who warned me that law practice
in service of goals one cares about is a not-so-slow-acting poison. At
some point in or around the fourth year of practice, too few
objective brain cells remain to sustain an academic career.
When I later joined the Columbia faculty, my own dean
counseled me to mind my scholarship first, get tenure, and only
then rekindle my interest in assisting condemned prisoners and
fostering educational reform. Although good advice on rationing
my time, this was also a warning against giving the colleagues who
would judge my tenure the wrong idea about my priorities.
The incompatibility assumption operates outside as well as
inside the academy. Recently, a group of Columbia University
colleagues and I published two statistical reports on the disturbing
frequency and causes of judicial reversals of American death
1
penalty verdicts. Members of the Association of Government
1.See James S. Liebman et al., A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995
(2000), at http://www.law.columbia.edu/media_inquiries/news/2002/broken_
system, reprinted in part in James S. Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in
Capital Cases, 1973-1995, 78 TEX . L. REV. 1839 (2000) [hereinafter Broken System I].
See also James S. Liebman et al., A Broken System, Part II: Why There Is So Much
Error in Capital Cases, and What Can Be Done About It? (2002), at
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Attorneys in Capital Litigation, along with the unidentified
individuals who operate a web site called prodeathpenalty.com,
organized a critical response to the reports, the main contention of
which was that we assuredly must have slanted the study results
towards high death penalty error rates because I, in the past, had
represented men on death row.
Never mind that two of our six team members, including the
senior statistician, approve of the death penalty, or that we
deliberately followed the most conservative canons of social science
2
practice. Never mind that the main subject of the attack, the 50%
to 90% rates of reversible error we found for most states over most
years, were easily testable by reading the same publicly available
court decisions we read and dividing the number of reversals by the
number of decisions. Never mind even that the government lawyers
asserting that “a sometime advocate for death row inmates could
not possibly conduct honest studies of the death penalty” are the
same people who remain confident of their own capacity to follow
professional norms of honesty every day, even when doing so
thwarts their advocacy goals, as well as their promises to voters to
expand the use of the death penalty.
The obvious implication is that, unlike other professionals,
scholars must choose between advocacy and a professional ethic of
candor and accuracy. Anti-death penalty advocates harbor the
same assumption, as witnessed by their occasional suggestion that
we soft pedal our findings that some states conduct capital
prosecutions more reliably than others and, more generally, that
3
there are better, as well as worse, capital-punishment practices.
I am old-fashioned enough to agree that scholarship and
advocacy should not be mixed in the same project, and that a
career that includes both requires a strong and strict commitment
http://www.law.columbia.edu/media_inquiries/news/2002/broken_system [hereinafter Broken System II] (last visited Sept. 2, 2003).
2.
For discussion of some of the methodological issues, see Brief Amicus
Curiae of 42 Social Scientists Concerning the Government’s Memorandum of Law
in Response to the Court’s Order of April 25, 2002, in United States of America v.
Alan Quinones et al., Case No. S3-00-Cr.-761 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y., filed May 31, 2002).
3. See also Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Should Abolitionists Support
Legislative “Reform” of the Death Penalty?, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 417, 418 (2002)
(cautioning that reforming current practices of capital punishment “may be
analogous to replacing the electric chair with lethal injection; the reformed
practice is unquestionably better . . . than the one rejected, but . . . also carries the
distinct possibility that it will normalize the underlying practice and avert the very
critical gaze that gave rise to the reforming impulse . . . .”).
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to disciplined compartmentalization. What I do want to suggest,
however, is that changes are afoot in both legal scholarship and
equal justice advocacy that make the two more compatible than at
any time during my legal career.
III. FADS AND FASHIONS IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, 1970-2003
Despite an explosion of scholarship about equal justice, the
last thirty years have not, as I have noted, been kind to scholarship
for equal justice. Part of the reason, I think, is law scholars’
attitudes towards two things: their audience and the facts.
When I was a law student in the mid-1970s, law schools were
just emerging from a long period in which the presumed audience
for legal scholarship was lawmakers, mainly judges but increasingly
4
legislators and administrators. The scholarly approach was to
survey the legal landscape and identify the doctrine or policy that
best explained the outcomes of relevant prior decisions, or to
propose doctrinal or regulatory modifications to better
5
accommodate existing doctrine to gradually changing conditions.
The facts or data bearing on these decisions were mainly legal facts:

4. This period of “doctrinal legal scholarship” flourished between 1870 and
1965. See Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1647, 1650
(1993). Also referred to as “legal modernism,” this period of scholarship was
“premised upon the belief in universal truths, core essences, or foundational
theories,” relying on the powers of legal reasoning to “penetrate the essential
mysteries of the legal and social worlds, rendering them amenable to legal
authority and control.” Gary Minda, One Hundred Years of Modern Legal Thought:
From Langdell and Holmes to Posner and Schlag, 28 IND. L. REV. 353, 354 (1995).
“[R]esearch was oriented toward reform and hence sought its primary audience
among those people—mainly legal professionals, including other law professors,
judges, legislators, and practicing lawyers—who were interested in improving law
and legal institutions.” Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 1314, 1314 (2002) [hereinafter Posner, Legal Scholarship Today (2002)].
“[L]egal scholarship was not directed at law professors as such; most of it was
aimed squarely at the profession at large, particularly judges and lawyers. This
orientation enabled judges and lawyers to contribute to it.” Id. at 1320.
5. The task of the legal scholar was “to extract a doctrine from a line of cases
or from statutory text . . . , restate it, perhaps criticize it or seek to extend it, all the
while striving for ‘sensible’ results in light of legal principles and common sense.”
Posner, Legal Scholarship Today (2002), supra note 4, at 1316. See also Charles W.
Collier, The Use and Abuse of Humanistic Theory in Law: Reexamining the Assumptions
of Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship, 41 DUKE L.J. 191, 195 (1991) (describing
doctrinal scholarship as “‘judicious,’ . . . largely descriptive, respectful of previous
authority, and faithful to existing law; . . . recommend[ing] only modest
improvements in the law.”).
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the black letter of common law doctrine, statute, and regulation.
Although case- and situation-specific facts were also relevant, they
were mundane. Anyone with the patience to identify them could
7
see clearly what they were.
Clinical legal education had just been invented, and for the
first time gave a small number of professors and students a chance
to engage in systematic instruction and learning for equal justice
while immersing themselves in “real” facts and cases. To the extent
clinical teaching generated scholarly writing about the doctrines
and policies being advocated, however, it was not very different
8
from other legal scholarship.
Things changed dramatically in the late 1970s and early
9
1980s. It may be that elite legal scholars, fresh from liberal
educations at top, newly meritocratic universities, law schools and
judicial clerkships, got bored with a proclaimed Langdellian
6. See Minda, supra note 4, at 360 (describing the norms of legal modernism,
which provided that the system could dictate “logically correct answers through
the application of abstract principles derived from cases . . . the system was capable
of providing uniquely correct solutions or ‘right answers’ for every case brought
for adjudication.”).
7. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today (2002), supra note 4, at 1320 (stating “I
cannot think of a single work of English or American legal scholarship published
before 1970 that would have posed the slightest difficulty of comprehension to
judges and lawyers.”).
8. See id. at 1314. In fact, even by the late 1960s and early 1970s, a number
of law professors had begun producing legal writings intended to be read by
professors as opposed to practitioners and judges. Id.
9. See Jay P. Moran, Postmodernism’s Misguided Place in Legal Scholarship: Chaos
Theory, Deconstruction, and Some Insights From Thomas Pynchon’s Fiction, 6 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 155, 155-57 (1997) (criticizing interdisciplinary legal studies as “an
intellectual amalgam based on the traditions of economics, philosophy, sociology,
literature, and other hitherto external disciplines” that at its worst has “creat[ed] a
mass confusion” and has “contribut[ed] to the erosion of reasoned principles
among today’s generation of law students”); Posner, Legal Scholarship Today (2002),
supra note 4, at 1316 (describing “interdisciplinary scholarship” as “looking at the
law from the outside, from perspectives shaped by other fields or scholarly inquiry,
such as economics, political theory, moral philosophy, literary theory, Marxism,
feminist theory, cultural studies, cultural anthropology, structuralism, and
poststructuralism”). See also Geoffrey Miller, A Rhetoric of Law, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
247, 247 (1985) (noting that “[s]tandard doctrinal analysis, which all but occupied
the field a decade ago, is now retreating before the onslaught of all sorts of fancy
new techniques. Strange-sounding jargon imported from other disciplines . . . is
appearing in the law journals.”); Minda, supra note 4, at 356 (contrasting legal
scholars who find the interdisciplinary approach to be confusing and to add little
to the understanding of the law to other scholars who view this form of scholarship
more positively, believing it has “ma[d]e law more responsive to changing values
and attitudes resulting from the diversity and plurality of an increasingly
multicultural world.”).
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doctrinal science that in reality seemed to be little more than
10
vocational training for judges and legal technocrats. Or perhaps
the increasing pay differential between legal and other university
professors made law teaching more attractive to academic-minded
recent graduates who otherwise would have ended up in the arts
11
and sciences. Whatever the cause, the result was increasing
disdain for professional education and infatuation with “real”
university disciplines such as economics, philosophy, and
12
literature.
And so, for the next quarter century, law professors (myself
13
included), acting with the zeal of the recent convert and the
dilettantish hubris of the legal profession from which they were
running, made themselves into instant experts in microeconomics,
political theory, and literary criticism. (I am reminded of a lawyer
friend, who after litigating a donut antitrust suit, fancied himself
the nation’s foremost expert on that hollow subject.)
Among the consequences of this reorientation towards the
“real” academy were a change in audience and diminishing interest in
social and practical facts. It is these two attributes of the legalacademic orthodoxy over the last thirty years that I think have been
particularly unwelcoming to scholarship for equal justice.
10. Cf. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today (2002), supra note 4, at 1317, 1324
(theorizing that interdisciplinary scholarship has grown largely because of the
expansion of the size of the legal profession and the number of law professors
since 1970 and that “[f]or a significant number of law professors to turn their back
on the practitioner audience, there must be enough law professors to create a
critical mass of readership”).
11. Cf. Collier, supra note 5, at 191 (“In recent years legal scholarship has
undergone changes so fundamental as to suggest the need for a reassessment of
law as an academic discipline, as a subject of study, and as an intellectual
institution . . . These changes have been wrought in part by a generation of new
legal scholars with professional academic training in the humanities and social
sciences, and in part by others who undoubtedly would have entered such
disciplines in more auspicious times.”).
12. See generally id. at 196-97 (illustrating the difference in legal scholarship
between the former “legal modernism” and the newer “interdisciplinary”
approach by comparing the titles of articles in two issues of the Yale Law Journal,
one from the late nineteenth century, the other from the 1980s); Minda, supra
note 4, at 367 (1995) (findng in legal scholarship during the 1970s and 1980s “at
least five new jurisprudential movements—law and economics, critical legal
studies, feminist legal theory, law and literature, and critical race theory” that
“question[ed] the once-dominant hold of modern jurisprudence” and “challenged
a number of core assumptions central to the work of [more traditional] legal
scholars.”).
13. See James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: “All-Out” School Desegregation
Explained, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1542-65, 1601-14 (1990).
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Suddenly, it was not judges or legislators or, God forbid, practicing
lawyers whom law professors wanted to talk to. Instead, like good
academics, they wanted to talk to each other, or better yet, to “real”
scholars in the “real” disciplines.
Perhaps because it was then the fashion in universities
generally, or at least in the highly academicized departments to
which these recent converts were attracted, the emphasis over the
last three decades fell squarely on theory, on elegant models, and on
Occam’s razor—the simplest, most stylized explanation possible for
the broadest amount of behavior. For these purposes, all but the
most general facts were an irrelevant distraction. On the microeconomically-minded right, the tendency was to assume away all
facts save venality—“rational self-interest.” On the critically minded
left, the analogous assumption was the monochromatic
subordination of the disadvantaged.
My own experiences in the job market for law teachers in the
mid-1980s illustrate this prejudice. Friends and classmates who had
preceded me into academia strongly advised that I never answer a
question posed during my capital-punishment-focused presentation
by stating that the questioner’s factual premises were belied by
circumstances in the death penalty world in which I had been
immersed for years. Instead, the drill was to say that the facts and
circumstances could not be otherwise than I claimed because my
theory told me so.
But as centuries turn, so do scholarly fashions. And in my
opinion, we are seeing the demise of the era of elegant theory.
Eventually, facts have a way of intruding. Among those insistent
facts are the inability of markets or existing government policies—
or, for that matter, traditional equal justice advocacy—to deal very
effectively with ongoing environmental degradation, revolving-door
recidivism by drug offenders, failing schools for poor and minority
children, chronic conviction of the innocent, abysmal conditions in
overseas plants, police misconduct, sexual harassment, and many
other problems that sound in (un)equal justice. Across all these
contexts, there is much to the widely held public view that
insufficient progress is being made in solving social problems, and
that the standard solutions of the right and the left are not
effective.
Even so, things are not as uniformly bad as, for example,
critical theorists might predict. The underclass persists, but the
African-American and Latino middle classes are expanding.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2003

7

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 15
L IEBMAN FINAL 081403.DOC

280

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

9/15/2003 5:53 PM

[Vol. 30:1

Achievement gaps remain, but pockets of school improvement can
be found. Sexual harassment and racial profiling are pervasive, but
some companies and police departments have developed credible
responses. The scourges of drug addiction and over-incarceration
continue, but some tough-love rehabilitation programs, operating
14
in or as alternatives to prison, have shown success.
14. For evidence of progress on these and other seemingly intractable
problems, see ARCHON FUNG ET AL., CAN WE PUT AN END TO SWEATSHOPS? (2001)
(advocating a system of third-party supervised self-monitoring of overseas working
conditions by corporations operating global supply chains); Joshua Cohen &
Charles F. Sabel, Sovereignty and Solidarity: EU and US, in Governing Work and Welfare
in a New Economy: European and American Experiments 691, 694-95 (Jonathan Zeitlin
& David Trubeck eds., forthcoming 2003), available at http://
web.mit.edu/polisci/research/cohen/sovereignty_and_solidarity_EU_and_US.pdf
(last visited Sept. 2, 2003); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment
Courts and Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831 (2000) (discussing
recent innovations in the use of court-monitored treatment plans for drugaddicted offenders); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative
State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997) (describing recent innovations in administrative
practice that involve collaboration among former adversaries and between them
and government officials); Brandon Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 41 (2001) (advocating a system of monitored information
collection, sharing, and comparison among police departments as a means of
combating racial profiling); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental
Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO.
L.J. 257 (2001) (championing the systematic use of performance monitoring and
benchmarking as regulatory tools in the environment and other areas); James S.
Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, The Federal No Child Left Behind Act and the PostDesegregation Civil Rights Agenda, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1703 (2003) [hereinafter Liebman
& Sabel, NCLB] (claiming that the No Child Left Behind Act is part of a national
“new accountability” movement for school reform that potentially could supplant
Brown v. Board of Education as the model for institutional reform and achievement
of effective education); Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in
Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551
(1997) (exploring the uses of community-based planning and monitoring as a
method of managing police discretion); Charles F. Sabel & William Simon,
Destabilization Rights: How the New Public Law Succeeds, __ HARV. L. REV. __ (2004)
(forthcoming) (describing an evolution in public law remedies from injunctive
command-and-control regulation towards experimentalist remedies that permit
collaboration, flexibility, and ongoing learning); Ann-Marie Slaughter, The
Accountability of Government Networks, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 347 (2001)
(describing the use of transgovernmental regulatory networks to help solve
important public problems); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001) (advocating a
multitiered and interactive “regulatory” framework for use by trial courts in
managing the compliance process in employment discrimination lawsuits); Louise
Trubek & Maya Das, Achieving Equality and Health: Health Care Governance in
Transition, 30 AM. J.L. & MED . (2003) (forthcoming); Note, After Sandoval: Judicial
Challenges and Administrative Possibilities in Title VI Enforcement, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1774 (2003) (proposing that administrative enforcement of Title VI be used to
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In the face of these stubborn and unpredictable facts, cracks in
the elegant-theory orthodoxy have appeared. Law-and-economists
who were content in the past with the bare assumption of rational
self-interest now find it necessary to supplement that assumption
with explanations such as path dependency, heuristic bias, and an
unruly gaggle of other circumstances that may cause people to
15
deviate from the quickest path to the most self-serving result.
Critical theory has likewise come to see that outcomes cannot
be predicted entirely along simple class, gender, or racial lines, and
has turned to more complex explanations. An example is
“intersectionality theory,” which explains outcomes as the result of
the intersection of disparate influences at which a particular group
of, for instance, poor and female but white, or middle-class and
16
male but African-American people are situated.
establish an experimentalist regime for improving the protection of the civil rights
of minorities affected by federally funded programs).
15. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some
Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1999); Jon D. Hanson &
Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation,
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1541-45 (1996); Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral
Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The “New” Law and Psychology: A
Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739, 743-45
(2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1997).
For cautions and criticism, see, for example, Gregory Mitchell, Taking
Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis
of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907, 1971-77 (2002); Robert E. Scott, The Limits of
Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603 (2000).
16. See, e.g., Linda L. Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bathwater, Racial
Imagery and Stereotypes: The African American Woman and the Battered Woman Syndrome,
1995 WIS. L. REV. 1003 (1995) (applying intersectionality theory in the context of
domestic violence); Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV.
1241, 1297 (1991); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701, 710-14 (2001) (discussing how courts have responded
to the idea of intersectionality).
Many on the left have also lost faith in federal judges as the best hope for
the oppressed. As a substitute, they invoke the American Legal Process School’s
faith in markets that are moderately regulated by federal legislators and
administrators. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL
CONFLICT 7-12 (1996); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL M INIMALISM
ON THE SUPREME COURT 3-23 (1999); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. PITT. L. REV.
691, 717-23 (1987); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law
Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 M ICH. L. REV. 707, 738-91
(1991); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The New Legal Process: Games People Play and the
Quest for Legitimate Judicial Decision Making, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 993, 1006-08 (1999);
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More generally, I detect two (for me, welcome) suspicions that
have recently gotten abroad in the legal academy: that the facts
matter, and that what is most interesting is not behavior and
outcomes that follow predictable paths, but rather the odd and
unexpected deviations from those tendencies. If I am right, we
should expect to see less energy being expended on proof that
people transact and vote according to their venal interests, that
members of vulnerable groups are inexorably dragged down by
discrimination and disabilities, and that the market or public
administration always, or never, works. Instead, I see a growing
recognition that the most noteworthy progress (or regress) occurs
in situations where a surprising capacity for cooperation and
public-mindedness surfaces (or, on the contrary, where there seems
to be a perverse attraction to self-defeating parochialism), or where
people or groups that should not succeed do, while the
beneficiaries of tried-and-true programs do not fare as well as
predicted. More and more, I expect legal scholars to ask whether
these exceptional situations are the rule. And more and more, I
expect them to find that the intensely observed facts of these
apparently anomalous situations reveal a variety of individually
limited—but in the aggregate, potentially powerful—“micro-rules”
about how serious public problems can be solved.
IV. A NEW SCHOLARSHIP FOR EQUAL JUSTICE
If trends in legal scholarship go in the direction that I am
suggesting, they could have three important effects on scholarship
for equal justice. First, a growing recognition of the poverty of
theory by itself and of the richness of idiosyncratic practice may
help inaugurate an era of scholarship that (i) is more attentive to
the facts of everyday and innovative practice, (ii) is aimed at a
broader audience, and (iii) permits a closer relationship between
teaching and research. Second, when applied to the topic of equal
justice, this new systematic search for exceptional reforms that work
better than expected for disadvantaged groups may suggest
changes in our conception of equal justice. Third, taken together,
this new form of scholarship and the new conceptions of equal
justice it implies may invigorate and promote engagement in
scholarship for equal justice.
Mark V. Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1502 (1985).
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A. The Importance of Facts, Audience, and the Connection Between
Teaching and Research
1. Matters of Fact and Practice
By way of acknowledging my personal stake in the predictions I
am making, let me use some of my own recent work to illustrate the
wide range of facts—especially facts about professional and reform
practices—and the ways of investigating those practical facts that I
17
believe are becoming a bigger part of legal scholarship.
As I mentioned, over the last few years, Columbia colleagues
and I have conducted empirical studies of the fate, in state and
federal appeals courts, of 6000 capital verdicts imposed in the
thirty-four capital states and 1004 capital counties between 1973
18
and 1995. Among the questions we asked in trying to determine
what does and does not work in the current administration of the
death penalty were: how many of those death verdicts were found
19
by appellate courts to be seriously flawed and reversed? (68%.)
Who did the reversing? (90% by elected state judges; over half of
the remainder by federal panels on which Republican appointees
20
predominated.) What part of the verdicts were found wanting?
(About half reversed the guilt finding of aggravated capital murder,
21
the other half reversed the death sentence.) Why were death
verdicts reversed?
(Mainly because of violations that risk
undermining the reliability of the verdict—incompetent defense
lawyers, prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evidence,
misinstruction of jurors; almost never grounds—such as
exclusionary rule violations—that do not bear very much on
22
reliability.) What happened when the reversed cases were retried?
(For state post-conviction reversals, where we collected data, over
80% ended with outcomes less than death, and 9% ended in
23
acquittals.) What are the implications for the surviving victims of
17. See supra note 14.
18. See Broken System I, supra note 1; Broken System II, supra note 1. For a
concise presentation of our findings, see Andrew Gelman, James Liebman &
Valerie West, A Broken System: The Persistent Patterns of Reversals of Death Sentences in
the United States (June 11, 2003) (forthcoming).
19. Gelman et al., supra note 18, at 2-4.
20. Id. at 6-7.
21. Id. at 4-6.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 6.
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the homicides involved and for the public? (Frustration, given that
the average outcome of a death verdict is its reversal on appeal and
the substitution, at retrial, of a term of years, and given that this
24
process typically lasts a decade or more.) Why is there so much
error? (Regression analyses indicate that political pressures to
increase the use of the death penalty—particularly in response to
high rates of violent crime affecting white as opposed to AfricanAmerican victims, and particularly in states in which it is easy for
voters to punish judges for unpopular decisions—substantially
increase the probability that any death verdict that is imposed will
25
be seriously flawed.) Are there solutions? (Possibly, via a variety
of substantive and procedural rules that ensure at each stage of the
process, from investigation and charging though trial and appeal,
that the penalty is reserved for offenders who can be shown by
comparative criteria and data drawn from the state’s own death26
sentencing practices to be the worst of the worst.) Are there
jurisdictions worth emulating? (Again, possibly. Examples may
27
include Colorado, Connecticut, and New York.)
Another group of colleagues and I have recently been
observing the operation and results of school reforms of a
particular, and we think promising, type at the classroom, school,
district, and state levels on the east side of Manhattan in New York,
28
and in various parts of Kentucky, North Carolina, and Texas.
These reforms involve groups of teachers, principals, staff
developers, and others in a self-conscious process of planning the
content and measuring the results of each student’s, teacher’s,
school’s and district’s particular set of learning and teaching
practices. Those observations then become the basis for revised

24. Broken System II, supra note 1, at 70-81.
25. Gelman et al., supra note 18, at 15-21.
26. See, e.g., id. at 21-24; James S. Liebman, An Effective Death Penalty? AEDPA
and Error Detection in Capital Cases, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 411 (2001); James S.
Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030 (2000); Kenneth
Williams, The Death Penalty: Can it be Fixed?, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 1177 (2002).
27. Broken System II, supra note 1, at 304-05.
28. See Liebman & Sabel, NCLB, supra note 14 (discussed supra note 14); see
also James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined:
the Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE __ (forthcoming 2003-2004) [hereinafter A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely
Imagined] (describing how a combination of movements towards standards,
changing goals of desegregation and school finance litigation, and state and
federal legislation have converged to create a promising experimentalist
framework for school reform).
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plans, improved measures of success, additional observations,
further revision, and so on until, over time, there arises a known set
of “better” (if never “best”) practices for use in recurring
circumstances.
2. Audience
The intended audience for my work has changed along with its
method. Instead of heavily footnoted, technically encoded articles
written for a small group of specialists whose own theorizing is the
raw material for mine, much of my recent work has been aimed at,
and written to be accessible to, the professionals and policy makers
who are the subject of my studies and proposals, and even the
wider public. Web access and media dissemination have become
important adjuncts to scholarly publication. Public presentations
at civic and community forums, in legislative hearings, and in and
through the media have supplemented scholarly colloquia and
conferences. Validation and criticism by skilled practitioners are
valued along with those by faculty colleagues.
3. Research Collaboration Between Teachers and Students
These changes have contributed in turn to new forms of
teaching, or more accurately, of research collaboration with law
students. Collecting and analyzing data, observing institutional and
legal practices, interviewing practitioners, and conducting case
studies of the development and progress of reform are all things
law students can learn or already know how to do as well as and in
some cases better than I. Law students helped draft the form we
used to collect information on our 6000 capital cases, collected
much of that data, and, working with graduate students, did a good
bit of the statistical analysis and coauthored our statistical reports.
Law students likewise conducted numerous interviews in Kentucky,
North Carolina, and Texas and wrote impressive case studies of the
school reforms there that my colleague Chuck Sabel and I have
used extensively in our writing on the subject.
Institutionalizing this process, Professor Sabel and I co-teach a
research course we call “New Forms of Public Interest Advocacy,”
which combines an advanced seminar in the theory and practice of
law reform with intensive research-and-writing projects that have
generated fascinating student studies of, for example: innovations
in the process of providing lawyers for indigent criminal
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defendants; the design and implementation of self-rule by the
Maori people of New Zealand, which in turn is influencing public
administration throughout that country; collaborative public and
private management of the ecosystem on the Mexico, Arizona, and
New Mexico border; the organization and use of parent and
community activism as a means of achieving accountable public
school outcomes in Kentucky; and the like. The idea here is that,
instead of imparting doctrine or skills we already have mastered to
students who have not, we are learning along with them. Instead of
passive receptors of information or apprentices, students are key
collaborators.
B. Exceptions that Work
The changes I am forecasting are not only in the focus and
methods of legal research and in their interaction with law
teaching. The changes may also extend to the ideas and legal
concepts that research and teaching generate. Consider as an
example the concept of equal justice itself.
Abstractly, the idea of equal justice is that all people deserve
the same opportunities and access to the same resources that are
29
entailed by their membership in the community. Applying this
abstraction in practice, however, inevitably requires that we identify
the opportunities and resources individuals deserve based in part
on what others, who in some sense are similarly situated, already
have. But this begs the vexing question of, who is similarly situated?
Whose endowments identify the opportunities and resources, and
even more problematically, the precise level of advantage, that
everyone deserves to have?
Traditionally, this question has been answered by first
identifying a group of people—say, middle class whites—who are
substantially more advantaged than the client group—say, poor
African-Americans. The situation of the favored group then has
been used as the standard by which to measure the constitutionally
required level of attainment by the disfavored group. But
29. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Neutrality, Process, and Rationality: Flawed
Interpretations of Equal Protection, 58 TEX . L. REV. 1029, 1030-48 (1980); Charles L.
Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 430 (1960);
Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term: Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination
Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7, 34-36, 42 (1976); Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme
Court, 1976 Term: Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1977).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss1/15

14

Liebman: Towards a New Scholarship for Equal Justice
L IEBMAN FINAL 081403.DOC

2003]

9/15/2003 5:53 PM

TOWARDS A NEW SCHOLARSHIP

287

identifying the appropriately favored group, as well as creating a
framework for analyzing the advantages available to that group
which the client population deserves to attain, and then meeting
the high mark that analysis sets, has proved extremely difficult both
in law and in practice.
The new approach to legal scholarship I have been sketching
here suggests a different, more tractable principle, or comparative
starting point, for equal justice analysis and action. That principle
can be stated as follows: When it comes to opportunities and
resources that are an essential building block of freedom and
happiness and over whose distribution the state exercises
substantial control, an explanation is owed if people who otherwise
are just like you systematically attain better outcomes than you do.
This basis for challenging disparities between two individuals
or groups may seem confusing or perverse. For the disadvantaged,
the whole point of equality is to be like those who are “better off,”
not like members of your own, disfavored group. Confusion
recedes, however, if one conceives of equal justice not as an ideal
end state, but as a requirement of steady progress towards that
state. From this perspective, the most powerful argument for the
position that the world does not have to be as unequal as it is, is the
existence of a group that is in all ways like the disadvantaged client
group except that, as a result of reasonable public policies or
action, the comparison group suffers less inequality.
Consider, for example, a school full of poor African-American
pupils whose average scores on the state’s test for educational
progress fall below the barest level of educational proficiency. Or
consider a school with a mixed population that overall does rather
well on the same test but whose Latino students mostly fail it. In
the past, orders to bring the averages of the poor and minority
children up to those of middle-class white children have
succumbed to a plea of ignorance and hopelessness by school
officials. In effect (if not always in quite these forthright terms), the
plea goes something like this:
If ordered to improve outcomes for all groups of students,
we will fail. When ordered to do so in the past, other
schools and districts have failed. No one really knows how
to improve outcomes for all groups or whether it is even
possible to do so. Conditions beyond educators’ control,
such as family and neighborhood influences, personal
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choices, and oppositional behavior,
consistently frustrate
30
the achievement of that goal.
But suppose a law scholar or group of law students (or anyone
else for that matter) identifies comparable schools in the state—
ones with roughly the same populations—where poor and minority
children perform substantially better on the tests. Suppose the
observer then asks why the first school full of failing African
American pupils, and the second school with a mainly proficient
student body but failing Latino students, are not performing as well
as comparable schools elsewhere in the state? Suppose the scholar’s
or students’ data inspire legal activists, legislators, administrators,
the courts, or the public to demand to know why these disparities
exist? Suppose these queries pose the further question whether the
less successful schools should be obliged, even legally obliged, to
meet the standard set by the other similar but more successful
schools? Note, finally, how the pressure to provide answers to these
questions is exponentially increased by the questioners’
presumptive proof, drawn from the actual experience of the school
system itself, that the conditions needed for kids to reach an
important benchmark level of performance are within the control
of school officials. At that point, the plea of ignorance that stymied
earlier equal justice initiatives rings hollow.
Once legal or other researchers identify the performance
measures, comparison groups, and disparate success rates needed
to expose, and put in question, these most egregious inequalities
(most egregious because they are demonstrably avoidable), that
information prompts still other reform-provoking questions: Why
30. For different versions of this conclusion, see, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 505
U.S. 70, 87-102 (1995) (permitting a school district operating under a
desegregation order to establish compliance, notwithstanding continuing racial
disparities in student outcomes, by linking those disparities to conditions the
Court considered to be beyond school officials’ control); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977) (absolving school boards of responsibility for
continuing racial disparities that are not the result of the board’s conduct of its
business); Paul L. Tractenberg, The Evolution and Implementation of Educational
Rights Under the New Jersey Constitution of 1947, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 827, 844-54 (1998)
(discussing the failure of a succession of school funding equity and other remedial
orders to overcome economic and racial disparities in student outcomes in New
Jersey’s public schools). See also Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 496 (1992)
(concluding that demographic changes sometimes cause racial imbalance in a
school district that is not attributable to school officials and thus is not actionable
under the Constitution); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 243 (1991) (finding
that the residential and resulting school segregation in the Oklahoma City School
District was the result of private decision making and economics, not state action).
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don’t school district and state officials themselves systematically
identify schools that succeed best with particular populations? Why
don’t they require less-effective schools to develop plans to match
the better results and to revise and try again if they fall short? Why
don’t officials prod the better-performing schools to reveal how
they succeeded, and to provide peer assistance to less successful
schools? These questions, in turn, lead to another: Are there legal
and institutional arrangements that serve to systematize these
experiments, comparisons, information exchanges, and upwardly
ratcheting standards?
Notice that the conception of equal justice these questions
imply does not put policy makers and judges in the impossible, and
strategically counterproductive, situation of having to identify the
constitutionally “deserved” level of a benefit or opportunity, or the
Archimedean population whose situation defines that level.
Instead, this “continuous improvement” conception of equal justice
treats the best levels recently attained by the most similar
population to be the minimum level that is provisionally deserved,
until the target institutions’ best efforts to match that minimum
level exceed it—thus creating a higher, but still provisional, legal
benchmark. Nor need there be only one benchmark at a time. If,
for example, even generally effective schools must improve not
only on average but for each of their populations (including poor,
minority, limited English proficiency, and special needs students),
then all schools will be evaluated against a variety of benchmarks,
creating multiple incentives to slowly but surely improve the
outcomes of all their students along a path marked by ever more
and challenging, but always demonstrably attainable, milestones.
This vision of poor and minority children on a highway to
educational heaven may seem like pie in the sky. Or it may seem
like another effete cogitation about, but not useful for, equal justice.
But it isn’t. The institutional architecture I just described in fact
exists in schools and districts in New York City, North Carolina,
Kentucky, and Texas—and to an extent at the state level in the
latter three states—with encouraging results for poor and minority
31
children. Even more surprising, the hypothesized comparative
basis for challenging disparities among public schools is in fact
codified in President Bush’s No Child Left Behind Act, complete
with racial and economic coding of results and the setting of
31.

See A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined, supra note 28.
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32

benchmarks for all public schools in the nation.
If reforms of this sort continue to take hold, many more
questions will cry out for scholarly attention. What triggers these
innovations in places where they have occurred, and why haven’t
their successes made the reforms wildly, as opposed to only
moderately, contagious? How can institutional architects fill gaps
in incipient structures, including some Grand-Canyon-sized gaps in
33
the No Child Left Behind Act?
What kinds of community,
administrative, and judicial enforcement mechanisms are available
if outcomes do not improve over time? What similar approaches
might succeed in other contexts, such as welfare, criminal justice,
employment discrimination, fair labor standards, and community
development?
C. Invigorating Scholarship for Equal Justice
My final hopeful prediction is that this new form of
scholarship, and the conception of equal justice it implies, may
invigorate and spread the practice of scholarship for equal justice.
This hope arises in part because this new approach to legal
scholarship may be able to supply what I have argued above are two
missing but critically important ingredients of successful efforts to
34
achieve equal justice. First, this fresh scholarly approach helps
provide a better understanding of what works when for which
subpopulations. Second, the approach aims to identify governance
structures that institutionalize the search for what works.
Governance structures can accomplish this goal by (i) assuring
front-line flexibility to experiment and to revise and experiment
again based on the results of the first experiment, while (ii)
endowing public actors and constituencies with real accountability
for the trajectory of those results and (iii) providing enough
transparency and coordination to enable similar actors in different
places to learn from each other.
Legal scholars should be especially good at devising these
32. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 6311 (2002); see also id. at § 6501 (defining the Act’s
purpose as “ensur[ing] that all children have a fair, equal, and significant
opportunity to obtain a high-quality education and reach, at a minimum,
proficiency on challenging state academic achievement standards and state
academic assessments.”).
33. See Liebman & Sabel, NCLB, supra note 14, at 1730-31.
34. See supra note 14 (citing sources that exemplify both of these attributes of
the new scholarship for equal justice).
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structures, or at least discovering them in operation and fleshing
them out. After all, it is the essence of law and lawyering to arrange
transactions and organizational structures to facilitate innovation,
accountability and coordination. Granted, the model legal actors
here—negotiators, deal makers, institution builders—are not the
litigators whom scholars for equal justice have usually thought of as
the subjects and beneficiaries of their research. But the work of
these new model actors is nonetheless quintessentially legal.
The switch in focus from enforcing rights to solving problems,
and from litigation to institutional architecture, also helps
neutralize the professional and ethical tensions that legal scholars
for equal justice face. A law review article that gussies up an
argument designed for a partisan legal brief raises objectivity
questions that proposing solutions—or administrative structures for
systematically identifying solutions—may not pose. The evaluative
criterion that applies to a brief as a piece of advocacy is potentially
quite different from the criteria that apply to an article as a piece of
scholarship. Rather than looking at whether or not an adversarial
argument will cause a court to rule as the lawyer and client want,
one examines whether the scholarly argument is sound and logical,
whether it identifies and grants what is due to the strongest
alternative view, whether it will lead to socially advantageous results,
and whether it increases the sum total of human knowledge.
Because these latter academic criteria are quite similar to the
standards problem-solvers in the field might use to evaluate
potential remedies for long-festering inequalities and injustices—
especially when competing remedies are systematically evaluated
based on comparisons of actual results—the risk of incompatibility
between scholarship and equal justice activism subsides.
There is at least one other advantage of this new approach to
legal scholarship. By enabling law professors to blend teaching and
scholarship more seamlessly through genuine research
collaboration with students, the new scholarship helps avoid the
zero-sum competition between teaching and research that for so
long has penalized law professors who make it a priority to train
students to be effective advocates for equal justice.
As this last point implies, I believe that engaging law students
in the close observation of the professional activity I call
“institutional architecture” is good training. It exposes law students
to creative practice and practitioners, and it exposes law students
for equal justice to a model of legal activism that usefully augments
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the litigation model that for so long has dominated the clinical
legal education to which these students gravitate. If I am right that
in the future much of the progress in attaining equal justice is likely
to occur through creative institutional architecture, this newly
collaborative scholarship for equal justice could become a crucial
training ground for a new generation of equal justice activists.
V. CONCLUSION
Some of what I have proposed here may sound perilously like
the precious theorizing from which I have tried to distance myself.
But in order to engage in the new equal-justice scholarship, legal
scholars need nothing more “highfalutin” than a pragmatic
willingness to study actual legal practices that seem to improve
outcomes for some part of the target population under some
identifiable set of institutional, regulatory, doctrinal, or contractual
circumstances. And the value of the enterprise, both as scholarship
and in promoting equal justice, turns on the answers to down-toearth questions, such as whether generating practical, fact-intensive
information about what works, when, and why is an important part
of the current equal justice agenda; whether doing so in a manner
useful for equal justice is within the capacity of legal scholars;
whether this new fact-based and practice-focused approach to
scholarship can help cure the academy of its longstanding allergy
to matters of fact and practice; and whether, if so, the new
scholarship is likely to be more favorably regarded in the legal
academy than past scholarship for equal justice.
Because I believe the answer to these questions is yes, I intend
these remarks as an enticing invitation for scholars and students to
experiment with the new scholarship for equal justice. But be
warned. By academic standards, at least, this is dirty work, hot
work. It is “pots boiling and pans frying in the kitchen” kind of
work, “wrenches under the hood” kind of work, not brandy snifters
in the drawing room. There are facts to soil your hands with—the
messy reality of what actually happens, unruly data, on-site
observation, interviews, web-site research, and all the tricky
interpretive questions such information poses.
And there is heat to be taken. Because of these interpretive
questions, you will be an inviting target for armchair criticism from
more sedentary colleagues. Yet, unlike many theorists, you will also
be operating in a field where you actually can be proven wrong, or
at least passé, in the event that the data come to show that the
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practices you thought were successes were not, or that new
successes have superseded the ones you identified. Worse still,
when you stick your neck out into the public arena with data
susceptible to these criticisms, you will surely be goring someone’s
prize ox—maybe someone who prefers liberty or community over
equal justice, or who shares your equal justice goals but stands by
the old, one-size-fits-all remedies that your methods call into
question, or, finally, who shares your respect for experimentation
but believes her experiment is better than the one your data singles
out.
None of this is nearly as comfortable as a well-insulated
drawing room. But it has its compensations of the “proof is in the
pudding” sort. If you are right, no matter what the criticism may
have been, the events themselves will be your best defender. And if
you are wrong and proven so, it may at least be because something
else worked better for equal justice, or perhaps because the
challenge issued by your “no pudding tops this” conclusion
prodded someone to find a pudding that does.
In any event, if you agree with me that the real scholarly and
equal justice action is now in the messy, bustling kitchen, and if you
think you can stand the heat, there are plenty of pots to be stirred.
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